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Fabian Schuppert and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Environmental Inequalities and Democratic
Citizenship: Linking Normative Theory with
Empirical Research∗
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to link empirical ﬁndings concerning environmental
inequalities with diﬀerent normative yard-sticks for assessing whether these inequalities
should be deemed unjust, or not. We argue that such an inquiry must necessarily take
into account some caveats regarding both empirical research and normative theory. We
suggest that empirical results must be contextualised by establishing geographies of
risk. As a normative yard-stick we propose a moderately demanding social-egalitarian
account of justice and democratic citizenship, which we take to be best suited to identify
unjust as well as legitimate instances of socio-environmental inequality.
1. Introduction
Within the literature on environmental justice one can ﬁnd a wide variety of
claims concerning the relationship between people's socio-economic status, their
natural and social environment, and impacts on their health and well-being.
These claims cover the entire spectrum from sceptical to alarmist, since there
exists signiﬁcant disagreement regarding the indicators, measures and results
diﬀerent empirical studies on environmental justice produce. While the major-
ity of researchers agree that certain forms of environmental inequalities exist, it
is a contested issue both whether these inequalities are harmful and thus unjust
and whether existing empirical research allows us to draw any general conclu-
sions from rather localised studies. In fact, even the name of the ﬁeld of study
is somewhat a misnomer, since most studies in the literature investigate envi-
ronmental inequalities and environmental factors as well as their eﬀects, rather
than environmental (in)justice per se.
Moreover, the normative concepts used are also ripe with controversy. In
many cases it is utterly unclear what states of aﬀairs on the basis of which
grounds should be labelled injustices, or how diﬀerent normative concepts such
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as well-being, equality and justice are connected to each other. However, as long
as we do not clearly identify the normative yardsticks we use, any normative
assessment of existing empirical research ultimately will be ﬂawed.
This paper is an attempt to provide one possible answer to the question
of when certain environmental inequalities should be considered unjust. Our
aim is to link empirical research with normative theory in order to critically
analyse the possible impact of environmental inequalities on people's right to
democratic citizenship. As we will argue, harmful environmental inequalities
can be identiﬁed by contextualising empirical ﬁndings and by paying special
attention to people's often multiple and cumulative social vulnerabilities, which
are indicators for existing geographies of risk. Moreover, some environmental
inequalities can indeed infringe upon people's right to democratic citizenship.
However, in order to decide whether diﬀerent environmental inequalities and
their eﬀects present cases of injustice, we need to set out the normative criteria we
are operating with, since diﬀerent theories of justice and democratic citizenship
will yield very diﬀerent results.
The paper will ﬁrst ﬂag up some key caveats which make answering the
question of whether environmental inequalities negatively aﬀect people's right
to democratic citizenship so diﬃcult. Second, we will review some of the key
ﬁndings from the empirical literature concerning the negative eﬀects of envi-
ronmental inequality on health. As will become clear, in order to fully grasp
the extent and complexity of existing environmental inequalities we need to
contextualise the environmental justice debate within wider inquiries on socioe-
conomic inequality and its harmful eﬀects, establishing distinct geographies of
risk. Third, we will brieﬂy review diﬀerent conceptions of justice and democratic
citizenship, as well as their underlying normative requirements. As will become
clear in section four, the normative assessment of geographies of risk through our
democracy-theoretic lens very much depends on the normative ideal of demo-
cratic citizenship and its underlying conditions of justice we employ. We will use
three diﬀerent readings of justice and democratic citizenship in order to assess
when environmental inequalities become environmental injustices. In so doing,
we will argue that a moderately demanding theory of justice and democratic
citizenship is best suited for this endeavour and that it allows us to distinguish
unjust environmental inequalities from unobjectionable ones.
2. Linking Empirical Research and Normative Theory:
Some Caveats and Notes of Caution
Empirical research oﬀers normative theorists a wide set of results on the exis-
tence and possible impacts of environmental inequality, while normative theory
provides empirical researchers with a well-stocked tool-box for evaluating results.
However, as noted in the introduction, signiﬁcant disagreement exists over the
correct interpretation of existing data sets and the nature of diﬀerent norma-
tive concepts. Therefore, before analysing the existing literatures and trying to
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link them, it is necessary to highlight some issues and caveats concerning both
empirical research and normative accounts of justice and democratic citizenship.
With regard to the empirical literature on environmental (in)justice we can
distinguish at least three areas of controversy which should be interpreted as
notes of caution against drawing hasty conclusions: deﬁnitional issues, mea-
surement issues and issues of particularism. Similarly, normative theory faces
deﬁnitional issues, too, as well as issues concerning its tendency to overgeneralise
and abstract. Let us brieﬂy explain the nature and scope of these issues.
2.1 Deﬁnitional Issues in Empirical Studies and Normative Theory
The ﬁeld of environmental justice research faces a range of controversial def-
initional issues, since even the basic parameters of the debate are contested.
What do we for instance mean by `environment' and `environmental factors'?
Environmental factors can include a wide range of things and phenomena, in-
cluding `pollutants, toxins, noise, and crowding as well as exposure to settings
such as housing, schools, work environments, and neighbourhoods' (Evans and
Kantrowitz 2002, 303). Depending on which factors we see as environmental,
our analysis will vary.
The same holds true for our conception of what counts as justice and in-
justice. Within the literature on environmental inequality justice as a concept
is used loosely and inconsistently (an observation also made by Walker 2012;
2009; Downey 2005). However, this is in part due to the ambivalence in the
normative literature, as well as the variety of partially contradicting deﬁnitions
and conceptions of justice available (which we will return to in section three).
This deﬁnitional uncertainty obviously matters signiﬁcantly, since the justice
framework we employ for our analysis determines our assessment; a strictly dis-
tributional understanding of justice will pick up on other factors than a justice
framework which includes procedural issues, well-being, or recognition (Schlos-
berg 2009; 2004; Ikeme 2003).
Moreover, many empirical studies seem to equate inequality with injustice,
which is problematic from a normative point of view (Walker et al. 2005, 361).
In fact, as mentioned earlier, even though the ﬁeld of research is commonly
called `environmental justice' research, we think it is better to speak in the
ﬁrst instance about environmental (in)equality, since most studies deal with
diﬀerences in environmental quality, vulnerability and the distribution of risk.
Whether all these empirical inequalities are unjust is a diﬀerent question. Thus,
in the interest of analytical clarity, for the remainder of the paper, we will use
the term environmental inequality rather than environmental justice.
2.2 Measurement and Particularism Issues in Empirical Research
Empirical studies on environmental inequality diﬀer widely in what they mea-
sure, how they measure it, how they frame the indicators and results, and what
kind of conclusions they allow for. That is to say, not only is it diﬃcult to
compare results because of an absence of standardised study designs (Sahsu-
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varoglu/Jerrett 2007, 243), but studies also are of varying quality and scientiﬁc
rigour (Bowen 2002). Under the overarching motto of environmental justice
studies look at a wide array of phenomena and indicators, including the distri-
bution of potentially and actually hazardous sites, the distribution of so-called
risk factors, spatial diﬀerences in environmental quality, health impacts, corre-
lations between varying factors, such as socio-economic status and exposure to
toxins, to name but a few. Thus, these studies oﬀer a wealth of information but
it is necessary to critically question what kind of inequality exactly the diﬀerent
studies measure, since proximity to a waste site is very diﬀerent from exposure
to toxins, which in turn is diﬀerent from observable health impacts (Walker et
al. 2005, 361).
Furthermore, most studies are limited in scope since they use particular in-
dicators within a particular space. In other words, many studies look only at a
particular city or a municipality and they use data sets which are easy to access
such as average income (as a short-hand for socio-economic status), postcodes
(as a short-hand for socially stratiﬁed groups), or mortality rates (as a short-
hand for severe health impacts). Needless to say, many of these data sets are
somewhat arbitrary and they operate at a certain level of abstraction, grouping
individuals into larger clusters. Therefore, it would be dangerous to generalize
results from a particular municipality to an entire country (Bowen 2002). Sim-
ilarly, some studies seem to commit a fallacy by trying to infer generalisations
about the status of individuals from data sets which are limited to speciﬁc groups
or neighbourhoods (Anderson 2009).
Most people doing empirical research on environmental inequalities are of
course aware of these issues, and we did not mention them in order to discredit
empirical research; not at all. Instead, our aim was to highlight the diﬃculty of
using individual empirical studies in order to arrive at sound normative judg-
ments concerning the possible existence and status of environmental inequalities
and injustices.
2.3 Generalisation and Abstraction Issues in Normative Theory
While empirical studies in the ﬁeld of environmental justice thus are often rather
limited in their scope, many normative theories suﬀer from the opposite problem;
normative accounts are often based on abstraction and are aimed at establishing
universal principles. The problem with this mode of operation is twofold and
similar to the caveats mentioned before concerning empirical inquiries: ﬁrst,
since most normative theories utilise several sub-concepts for establishing their
deﬁnition of justice, or democratic citizenship, or whatever, the resulting theory
is loaded with deﬁnitional assumptions and abstractions; second, using universal
principles, for instance, for distinguishing between unjust actions and just actions
can run into problems if each action is assessed individually without taking its
context into account. Here are two examples to illustrate both these points.
First, if one were to deﬁne an injustice as an action which harms another
person, one has a host of questions to address, or one needs to buy into rough
and ready answers to these questions which means buying into a whole range of
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assumptions and abstractions. Thus, in the case of `injustice is harming another
person', the questions one would need to answer would include (but are not
limited to): What do we mean by harm; is there a diﬀerence between action
and inaction; does it matter whether one intended to harm the other, or not?
So, using the above mentioned deﬁnition of injustice does not deliveras some
authors assumea clear normative yard-stick, but it is in many ways only the
top of the iceberg.
Second, often the deontic status of an act depends on the circumstances of
that act. A universal principle like `an action is only unjust if it directly harms
somebody' might prove unhelpful if we deal with cases of cumulative harm, such
as environmental pollution or greenhouse gas emissions. First, it is not at all
clear that pollution and emitting as such is an injustice. Every human being
must emit at least to a minimal amount to fulﬁl its everyday needs and to
survive. Second, individual acts of pollution and emissions by one individual do
in most circumstances not lead to any harm. It is the over-accumulation of both
which harms. Third, these harms, however, are not necessarily harms befalling
currently living persons. In several cases they concern future not yet existing
persons which might or might not come into existence. This raises another
obvious (but diﬃcult to answer) question: is it really possible to harm future
people?
Both these examples show why it is good to carefully analyse the normative
categories one wants to use for assessing empirical results, since subscribing to
simple one-principle solutions will often prove detrimental to the overall validity
of one's argument. Normative theory is a linguistic mineﬁeld and it is crucial
to be aware of normative theory's shortcomings before passing judgment on
whether a particular state of aﬀairs presents an injustice or not.
More generally speaking, when empirical researchers want to learn from nor-
mative theorists and vice versa, they should be careful not to oversimplify the
contributions available in the other ﬁeld or to look for answers which normative
theory / empirical research just cannot provide. With these caveats in mind, let
us take a look at some key ﬁndings we can take away from the existing empirical
literature on environmental inequalities.
3. Insights from Empirical Research on Environmental
Inequalities
As mentioned earlier, empirical research provides such a wide range of results
that it would be impossible to discuss all of them here. Instead, within our
analysis of existing empirical research on environmental justice we will focus
on studies which investigate the nexus between people's socio-economic sta-
tus (SES), environmental quality and discernible health and well-being impacts.
While the study of the complex nexus between SES, environmental factors and
health still faces many challenges (Bell et al. 2005), highlighting the interrela-
tionship between people's SES, environment and health allows for interesting
cross-fertilisation with research on social epidemiology, social vulnerability and
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the social gradient in health. As we will see, our framing of the literature is
conducive to identifying the multiple and cumulative eﬀects of diﬀerent socio-
environmental factors on people's overall vulnerability, health and well-being.
3.1 Environmental Inequalities and Health
The nexus between environmental factors and health is well established. For
example, air quality and exposure to particulate matter air pollution have sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on people's health, including the respiratory system and heart
diseases (Kampa/Castanas 2008; Koton et al. 2013; Myers et al. 2013). A wide
range of studies shows (Anderson 2009, 145; Hoﬀmann et al. 2009; Chaix 2006;
O'Neill et al. 2003; Kingham/Pearce/Zawar-Reza 2007) that an inverse relation
exists between a neighbourhood's socio-economic position and its air quality,
though there are diﬀerences with regard to the strength and reliability of this
inverse relationship, depending on the geographical space the study refers to
and the measures it employs. Moreover, there are some exceptions to this rule
(e.g. Forastiere et al. 2007), which established that higher SES actually meant
higher exposure to air pollution. Interestingly though, the study showing these
exceptions still found that areas with lower SES were particularly vulnerable to
higher particulate air pollution.1
What is important for our analysis here, though, is that the nexus SESair
quality seems to be well enough established to be a mere coincidence. In fact,
there seems suﬃcient evidence to claim both that those with lower education,
income, or employment status have higher risk [of cumulative and multiple ex-
posure to environmental impacts and] of death (Bell/Zanobetti/Dominici 2013,
865) and that across the European Union a social gradient in air pollution expo-
sure exists (Kohlhuber et al. 2006), even though available data sets are somewhat
incomplete and limited in scope.
3.2 Geographies of Exposure, Vulnerability and Risk
Several studies show that environmental inequalities often cut across a whole
range of factors, including (multiple) proximity to waste and hazardous sites,
exposure to toxins and pollution, increased vulnerability due to lower and/or
inadequate safety mechanisms and infrastructure, as well as higher social and
biological susceptibility (Jerrett/Finkelstein 2005; Walker 2009; Walker et al.
2005; Hornberg/Pauli 2007). Against this background, rather than exclusively
focusing on particular environmental inequalities, then, we should be sensitive
to existing geographies of risk (Jerrett/Finkelstein 2005; Walker 2009), or `risk-
scapes' (Morello-Frosch/Shenassa 2006; Morello-Frosch/Pastor/Sadd 2001), and
engage in careful cumulative risk-assessment factoring in socio-economic inequal-
ities, social vulnerabilities, exposure to environmental risks and hazards, as well
as biological susceptibility (Morello-Frosch et al. 2011).
1 The study by Forastiere et al. 2007 raises the issue of the diﬀerence between exposure,
risk, susceptibility and health impact (Walker et al. 2005; O'Neill et al. 2003). This is an issue
we will discuss further below.
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Geographies of risk are established by combining the results of two other
geographies: geographies of exposure and geographies of vulnerability. In other
words, in order to properly identify complex patterns of unequal risk distribu-
tion and their associated negative impacts, we have to construct geographies of
exposure alongside with geographies of vulnerability which in conjunction allow
us to establish geographies of risk (Jerrett/Finkelstein 2005).2 But what exactly
is meant by these geographies, what do they track and tell us, and why do they
matter for our normative analysis?
If we take our bearings from the empirical literature on the nexus SESair
pollution, we can see that socio-economic inequalities and their associated vul-
nerabilities have a huge impact on people's vulnerability and social susceptibility
to environmental risks (Fairburn/Butler/Smith 2009). On top of that, it is a
fact that many vulnerable groups are exposed to multiple and cumulative risks
which leads to a strong socio-environmental gradient in health and well-being
(Morello-Frosch et al. 2011; Fairburn/Butler/Smith 2009; Evans/Kantrowitz
2002; Walker 2009). However, any mono-causal analyses of this nexus would fall
short, since proximity does not determine health impacts, and exposure must be
analysed in conjunction with and not separate from susceptibility and vulnerabil-
ity (Makri/Stilianakis 2008).3 Since the causes of most social and environmental
inequalities are multifactorial, we argue that any normative assessment should
be sensitive to all three issues; exposure, vulnerability and overall risk (which
includes susceptibility issues). First, we establish who is exposed and who is
vulnerable, giving us geographies of exposure and vulnerability. Then we use
these insights to establish geographies of risk.
Geographies of exposure map out to what kind of environmental factors a
person is, or groups of people are (depending on the level of one's analysis),
exposed to. Geographies of exposure track factors such as air and water quality,
noise pollution, levels of radiation and the like. This suggests that geographies
of exposure focus primarily on actual environmental factors a person or group is
subject to. In addition, geographies of exposure also record proximity to high-
risk sites, such as toxic waste facilities. However, as we will see in our discussion
in section four, exposure is unlikely to be relevantly tracked by one's normative
theory, unless one subscribes to an overly rigid account of equal democratic
citizenship. Actual geographies of exposure, meanwhile, provide an important
indicator for establishingin conjunction with geographies of vulnerability
geographies of risk.
Geographies of vulnerability, meanwhile, map out a person's or a group's com-
bined social, economic and political vulnerabilities. We propose to treat vulner-
ability as such a wide category in order to get a better understanding of the
various factors and circumstances which inﬂuence a person's or group's capacity
to deal with harms and unexpected changes. In so doing, our conception of ge-
2 While our analysis concerning geographies of risk is indebted to Jerrett's and Finkelstein's
work, it is important to note that we deﬁne the diﬀerent geographies in a slightly diﬀerent way
than Jerrett and Finkelstein and with an alternative purpose in mind. We will come back to
this point below.
3 Similarly, those who emit do not necessarily suﬀer the consequences in terms of reduced
air quality and health impacts (Mitchell/Dorling 2003).
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ographies of vulnerability goes beyond mere geographies of susceptibility, which
are used in classical environmental inequality research. Social inequalities are
complex and multi-factorial, spanning a wide spectrum of issues such as housing
quality, access to health care, availability of social capital, wealth and income.
These social inequalities signiﬁcantly aﬀect people's susceptibility, as well as peo-
ple's capacity to avoid exposure in the ﬁrst place, because economic and political
inequalities often go hand in hand with other social inequalities. Vulnerability,
then, is a function of a person's (or group's) (in)capacity to respondin light
of her (or its) social, political, biological and economic statusto harms, unex-
pected changes and negative outcomes. Establishing geographies of vulnerability
allows us to track this complex and multifaceted nexus.
Geographies of risk, meanwhile, pick up on overlaps and correlations be-
tween geographies of exposure and geographies of vulnerability, creating thus
`risk-scapes', that is, detailed mappings of a person's or a group's socio-political
and environmental vulnerability and exposure to risk. In short, geographies
of risk allow us to see which groups in a given society/region/municipality are
particularly at risk to suﬀer or de facto do suﬀer from the adverse eﬀects of
socio-environmental inequalities. By contextualising the data from environmen-
tal inequality research within wider research on socio-economic inequalities and
political disenfranchisement, geographies of risk deliver a clear picture of the
nature and scope of inequalities in societal risk distribution and its associated
ill-eﬀects on factors such as health and well-being.
For policy-oriented normative theorists these empirical ﬁndings and their
associated geographies prove invaluable. As Breena Holland (2008, 319) ob-
serves, exposure and vulnerability to environmental risks inﬂuences factors such
as health which might signiﬁcantly impact on what a person does and can be,
especially if we factor in the possibility of premature death. However, in order
to distinguish between trivial inequalities in exposure and risk (since perfect
equality seems simply unattainable) and objectionable unjust inequalities, the-
orists need a normative yard-stick against which to measure empirical studies
and their often tentative normative terminology. From our viewpoint of jus-
tice and democratic citizenship the question arises of which inequalities prove
objectionable and on which grounds. Phrased diﬀerently, having established
geographies of risk we now need well justiﬁed normative theories which clar-
ify whether certain socio-environmental inequalities undermine people's status
as free and equal citizens (e.g. through undermining people's right to political
participation or misrecognizing people's claims to equal citizenship) (Schlosberg
2004, 529).
4. Clarifying Normative Theory: Three Accounts of Justice
and Democratic Citizenship
In order to asses in section four which socio-environmental inequalities prove
objectionable from the viewpoint of justice and democratic citizenship we must
ﬁrst determine what we mean when we use the terms `justice' and `democratic
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citizenship'. Before we do so, however, we should explain why we choose for our
analysis a democracy-focused angle. On our view there are four good reasons to
approach the issue of environmental inequalities through the lens of democratic
citizenship. First, the environmental justice literature had from its very birth a
deep concern with the unequal distribution of environmental risks and burdens
along racial and class lines, criticising established practices as treating racial
minorities and socially lower classes as second-class citizens or worse. Second,
an explicit analysis of how and why the right to democratic citizenship can be
undermined by environmental inequalities is most often missing in this debate.
Third, social psychological justice research suggests that in many instances
depending on contextprocedural aspects to decide the distribution of beneﬁts
and burdens bears greater relevance than the degree of rightness of the even-
tual outcomes (e.g. Brockner/Wiesenfeld 1996; Hauenstein/McGonigle/Flinder
2001). Furthermore, it can be argued that in cases in which, due to technical
or safety reasons, no fully just distribution of risks is possible legitimacy is key
for securing acceptance of the distributive outcome (Krütli et al. forthcoming).
Therefore, democratic citizenship seems to be a promising lens for investigating
environmental inequalities.
However, as stated in section one, we need to be aware of the caveats con-
cerning normative theory, particularly the contentious issue of deﬁning concepts
like justice and democratic citizenship. We need to be careful not to subscribe
blindly to a particular conception of justice and democratic citizenship, which
in a question begging manner predetermines which socio-environmental inequal-
ities are deemed unjust. Therefore, prior to answering the question of whether
a certain state of aﬀairs is unjust it is important to introduce some vocabulary
and to make clear what diﬀerent understandings of justice and of the interre-
lation between justice and the entitlement to free and equal citizenship can be
found in the literature. Since the literature on these topics is too wide to be
adequately covered in this section, we will focus on three paradigmatic accounts
of justice and democratic citizenship. Before that, however, we must explain in
a bit more detail wherein the contested deﬁnitional issues concerning justice and
democratic citizenship lie.
4.1 Justice, Democracy and Three Accounts of Citizenship
Most normative political theories of justice and democratic citizenship subscribe
to the basic idea that a just society is a society in which all members are free and
equals. As Ronald Dworkin (2000, 1)amongst othershas famously pointed
out, treating others as equals should not be mistaken for postulating that we
should always treat all people equally (in a strict materially distributive sense).
Accordingly, we centrally have to distinguish between equal treatment and treat-
ment as equals; simply giving everyone an equal slice when distributing a cake
without any regard for needs or desert or any other criterion would mean to
treat all equally. If we were to distribute the cake on the basis of how well-oﬀ
people are, or how much they have contributed to baking the cake, we would
in some way at leasttreat all as equals. However, what it exactly means that
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all members of a society are treated as equals is a contested issue in normative
theory, since there exists disagreement over the criteria with regard to which all
members of society should be treated as equals.
Similar disagreement exists with regard to the institutional requirements of
a functioning democracy and the basis for democratic citizenship. That is to
say, even though most theories in normative political philosophy agree with the
above-mentioned deﬁnition of a just society, i.e. that it is a society in which all
are free and equal, what this entails with regard to the political institutions of
that society and the socio-economic basis of citizenship is highly controversial.
Moreover, while most theories also agree that democracy provides us with a
political system in whichat least in theoryall are not only equal but also free,
the exact deﬁnition of democracy and its preconditions are the subjects of heated
debates. In its most basic form, democracy can be deﬁned as a system in which
all members of society (should) have an equal say or be able to participate as
equals in collective decision-making. This status of each individual to be able to
participate as an equal in collective decision-making is referred to as democratic
equality, or democratic citizenship.
On top of these deﬁnitional controversies within theories of justice and the-
ories of democracy, there also exists disagreement over the exact relationship
between justice and democracy.4 Is democracy prior to justice, in that only
democratic decisions among equals can determine what should count as just?
Or is democracy derivative of justice, meaning that democratic decisions can
only claim legitimacy as long as these decisions do not conﬂict with the basic
principles of justice?
For our discussion here we take the idea that each and every member of
society should enjoy equal social status as our starting point, since it seems
to act as a common denominator amongst the most convincing and important
existing theories of justice and democratic citizenship. In so doing, we assume
that justice and democracy are intricately linked, since a just society is a society
of equals, which entails that all members of society should have a say in collective
decision-making. At the same time, democratic decisionseven though all had
their say in arriving at a certain decisionshould not undermine the basic equal
status of all members of society. Thus, for the purpose of the following discussion
of the three paradigmatic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship we will
presume that a) all members of a society should be respected and treated as
equals, and b) that diﬀerences in basic social status, as in caste societies or
in slavery-based societies, are unjustiﬁable or illegitimate, as well as c) that
all members of society should havequa democratic citizenshipthe right to
participate as equals in collective decision-making.
As will become clear, though, despite this basic agreement, the three possible
accounts we discuss arrive at very diﬀerent conclusions. So let us now turn our
4 Even though for most readers it is probably somewhat intuitively clear that justice and
democracy should go hand-in-hand, in normative theory the analysis of the relationship be-
tween justice and democracy is not only controversial but it has also been somewhat neglected.
Important exceptions include van Parijs 1996; 2011; Dowding et al. 2004); Christiano 2004;
2010; Gould 2004; Wall 2007; Pettit 2012; Valentini 2012.
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attention to three paradigmatic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship,
namely, the formal-procedural account, the comprehensive-substantive account,
and the moderately demanding social-egalitarian account. While these three
accounts are obviously abstractions and so-to-speak ideal types, analysing their
normative underpinnings and consequences will allow us to assess in the following
section which environmental inequalities, respectively which geographies of risk
should be considered unjust and for which reasons.
4.2 The Formal-procedural Account
The formal-procedural account of justice and democratic citizenship focuses on
the protection of a range of basic rights as well as people's associated liberties.
Thus, for champions of this account equality is best understood as referring to
the formal and legal rights each and every citizen enjoys, such as the right to
life, the right to vote, and all the other rights which are normally considered
basic rights.5 The underlying idea is that these equal rights are an essential
aspect of securing people's basic liberties. In other words, most champions of
the formal-procedural account base their theory on and around the commitment
to people's liberty in the sense of the absence of unjustiﬁed interference.6 Hence,
defenders of the formal-procedural account commonly argue against major state
interventions since that would interfere with people's liberty to live their own
life according to their own conceptions of the good.
The formal-procedural account assumes that once people's basic rights and
associated liberties are protected and as long as every member has the right
to vote and participate in political decision-making all ensuing states of aﬀairs
are legitimate and just. The formal-procedural account of justice thus holds
to a rather libertarian understanding of what it means to treat and respect
all members of society as equals. Accordingly, this account claims that all are
treated as equals as long as their basic formal rights and liberties are protected
and equality before the law is secured, since it is only these forms of equality
which are needed in order to protect every citizen's liberty to live as he/she sees
ﬁt.
Similarly, the formal-procedural account holds that democratic citizenship
for all amounts to safeguarding every citizen's right to vote and to participate
in collective decision-making. Since the underlying normative commitment of
most champions of the formal-procedural account is to individual liberty, se-
curing democratic citizenship is chieﬂy seen as an issue of ensuring equal legal
status for all. In other words, the legitimacy of democratic decisions is primarily
determined procedurally; if all members of society had the right to vote and
the right to participate in the decision-making process democratic decisions are
5 Other rights which are commonly assumed to be basic rights include the right to freedom
of thought, the right to freedom of association, the right to freedom of expression, the right to
freedom of movement, the right to due process and the like.
6 This way of specifying the understanding of liberty used in this paradigmatic account is
based upon Isaiah Berlin's description of so-called `negative liberty' (Berlin 1969).
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deemed legitimate as long as they do not violate the equal legal status of all, as
deﬁned above.7
In short, the formal-procedural account emphasizes the formal equal status
of all citizens and it advances a libertarian understanding of the institutional
requirements of a just society. As long as people's basic formal rights and lib-
erties are secured, people should have the freedom to decide for themselves and
the state should stay out of it. In consequence, democratic decision-making is
limited to the sphere which does not infringe upon individual liberties.8 At the
same time this account puts high emphasis on the formal legitimacy of political
decisions. As long as all had the formal right and possibility to participate in
decision-making and their formal rights and liberties are protected by the deci-
sion taken, any decision must be accepted as legitimate irrespective of whether
the inequalities it establishes could be considered harmful or objectionable.
4.3 The Comprehensive-substantive Account
While the formal-procedural account advances a `hands-oﬀ' mentality, the com-
prehensive-substantive account is at the other end of the spectrum. Champions
of the comprehensive-substantive account are normally ﬁrst and foremost com-
mitted to ensuring each and every citizen's substantive social equality, a task
which can only be accomplished if democratic processes and people's free interac-
tions are eﬀectively regulated (van Parijs 1996; 2011; Arneson 2004; Wall 2007).9
However, this is not to say that defenders of the comprehensive-substantive ac-
count would be subscribing to an illiberally paternalist state or anything the
like. Instead, champions of the comprehensive-substantive account are most of-
ten relatively strict (comprehensive) egalitarians, that is, they argue that a just
society only treats its members as equals if all achieve more or less equal liv-
ing conditions, and if all enjoy equal opportunities and control roughly equal
amounts of resources.10
7 Put diﬀerently, what is important for equal citizenship according to the formal-procedural
account is that all can express their interests in a non-discriminatory voting procedure. Ag-
gregating these diﬀerent interests to ﬁnd where the majority lies within society then leads to
legitimate policy decisions. Classical statements of this view have been established by Bobbio
1987 and Dahl 1989.)
8 This is the reason why this account can also be labelledfollowing David Heldprotective
democracy or legal democracy (Held 2006, chap. 3, 201ﬀ.). Champions of the protective view
are thought to include such classical authors as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Charles
Montesquieu. The most prominent champions of legal democracy are, according to Held,
Friedrich von Hayek 1960 and Robert Nozick 1974) both libertarian theorists of justice. This
is the reason why this account has a close aﬃnity with libertarianism. In democratic theory,
however, the views we have in mind here are often treated under the label `liberal democracy'
which is in tension with how liberalism is understood in the domain of social justice research.
9 In fact, in some parts of the egalitarian literature one gets the impression that achieving
just distributions takes precedence over concerns for whether bringing about these distributions
had been democratically legitimised in the ﬁrst place.
10 To be sure, proponents of such an account disagree on how the three forms of equality
mentioned must be understood and whether or not all three forms are necessary for a just
society. The main point, though, is not that champions of this account favour all of these
three kinds of equality but that they advance a more comprehensive and substantive vision of
a just society than champions of the formal-procedural account.
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What is important for our discussion here is that the comprehensive-substan-
tive account construes the range (or scope) of justice to be much wider and
deeper than the formal-procedural account. For defenders of the comprehensive-
substantive account treating all members of society as equals and respecting their
equal status requires much more than protecting every person's basic formal
rights and liberties. Accordingly, the comprehensive-substantive account holds
that people cannot interact as equals if they are not substantively equal, that is,
also with respect to the material holdings they have, the opportunities they enjoy,
the welfare they achieve and the relationships they stay in. Obviously this is a
very tall order and to make people in a comprehensive way substantively equal
requires large-scale redistribution and wouldwith regard to existing political
institutionsdemand major institutional changes.
Moreover, this commitment to a strongly egalitarian ideal also inﬂuences this
account's conception of democratic citizenship. According to the comprehensive-
substantive account, democratic citizenship does not only require that people
enjoy the right to vote and to participate in collective decision-making, but it
also requires that people enjoy shared control, as well roughly equal authority
and inﬂuence. However, because of its demanding conception of justice, the
comprehensive-substantive account also restricts the scope of democratic deci-
sions more heavily than the formal-procedural account, since any decisions which
undermine the comprehensively and substantively equal status of all members
of society will be deemed either illegitimate or at least in need of revision (van
Parijs 1996; 2011; Arneson 2004).
4.4 The Moderately Demanding Social-egalitarian Account
The moderately demanding social-egalitarian account holds that the equal social
status of all members of society is only protected if people do not only enjoy
equal rights, but if they also enjoy suﬃcient resources and if people stand in
broadly egalitarian relationships to each other. Similarly, people only enjoy
equal democratic citizenship if they do not only enjoy the formal rights to vote
and participate in collective decision making, but if they also are not subject to
socio-political domination or status-undermining structural inequalities.11
In contrast to the comprehensive-substantive account, however, champions
of this account leave more room for collective decision-making. According to
their view, most claims about justice and its principles depend on whether or
not they can be legitimated through processes of collective decision-making. But
as these processes presuppose an equal standing of all citizens, policy decisions
are strictly restricted by the substantive conditions necessary to secure free and
equal citizenship.12 On the other hand, according to this account many claims of
justice must depend on the consent of citizens, that is, many questions regarding
justice must be settled through procedurally fair democratic mechanisms, under
conditions of equal citizenship.
11 See for instance Anderson 1999.
12 Variations of this view include Gould 2004; Brettschneider 2005; Christiano 2010; Pettit
2012.
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Therefore, equal respect for individual interests can only be ensured if not
only an authority (some citizens) determines which political decisions are taken,
but if all citizens `on whom the rules have a major impact' are equally involved in
determining political decisions (Christiano 2010, 56). This means that decisions
about distributing burdens and beneﬁts within society must be, in some way or
other, justiﬁable to all members of a society, for instance through satisfying the
demands of public reason (Habermas 1997; Rawls 1993). Put diﬀerently, what
is important for democratic citizenship is that no-one is arbitrarily dominated
by someone else (Pettit 1997, 69). Thus, in collective decision-making political
power must be shared and all must have eﬀective opportunities to inﬂuence
policy decisions. This makes it necessary that respective substantive conditions
of equality are secured for all citizens.
The moderately demanding social-egalitarian account thus has two impor-
tant parts; on the one hand, it sees a whole range of socio-economic inequali-
ties as incompatible with the ideal of equal democratic citizenship, since socio-
economic inequalities often go hand-in-hand with domination, unequal political
inﬂuence and harmful diﬀerences in social status. On the other hand, the social-
egalitarian account also places certain limits on the range of possible outcomes
from democratic decision-making, namely, in cases in which democratic deci-
sions undermine people's status as free and equal citizens. This feature of the
moderately demanding social-egalitarian account is particularly interesting since
the account also aﬃrms the authority of democracy, by arguing that `socially
not unjust' inequalities can be legitimated through democratic consent.13
Viewed in light of these three paradigmatic accounts of justice and democratic
citizenship it becomes clear that whether or not multiple socio-environmental
risks are objectionable does not only depend on whether they undermine the
entitlement to free and equal citizenship; it also highly depends on the nor-
mative framing, that is, which account of justice and democratic citizenship
one employs. How these diﬀerences in assessing socio-environmental inequalities
bear relevance, and whatif anystandards of socio-environmental justice can
be argued for as fundamental to guarantee free and equal citizenship, are the
questions to which we now turn.
5. Assessing the Normative Status of Socio-Environmental
Inequalities
Depending on what normative convictions back the assessment of socio-environ-
mental inequalities and their impact on the entitlement to free and equal demo-
cratic citizenship, the interpretations of empirical results will vary. In this sec-
tion, we will apply the three accounts of justice and democratic citizenship in-
13 We used here the somewhat awkward term `socially not unjust' rather than just, in order
to show that not all inequalities which are not as a matter of principle unjust must be on the
social-egalitarian account fully just. In fact, leaving room for debate on issues such as this is,
in our view, one of the core strength of the social-egalitarian account.
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troduced in section three, in order to assess the empirical results we introduced
in section two. As we will see, the results vary signiﬁcantly.
In section two we argued that the assessment of environmental inequalities is
best done through the identiﬁcation of geographies of risk comprising the signif-
icant overlaps between exposure to environmental impacts and socio-economic
vulnerability. For our normative assessment these overlaps are most signiﬁcant
because if disadvantage in exposure and disadvantage in socio-economic status
coincide we have good reasons to assume that we indeed have identiﬁed an en-
vironmental injustice. In other words, while socio-economic segregation in a
society might be objectionable from the viewpoint of social justice more gener-
ally speaking, in order to call something an environmental injustice, we obviously
will have to link socio-economic inequalities to environmental issues, such as for
example high exposure to pollution.
Let us now, with these considerations in mind, look at how the three paradig-
matic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship will assess the environ-
mental inequalities discussed in section two. We will see that our democratic-
theoretic lens proves most helpful if we adopt the moderately-demanding social-
egalitarian account. The formal-procedural account by contrast allows, in most
cases, only for a limited critical assessment of any environmental inequalities
since as long as people's basic formal rights are not undermined these inequal-
ities provefrom the viewpoint of formal-procedural justice and citizenship
unobjectionable. The comprehensive-substantive account on the other hand is
too demanding; it takes virtually all environmental inequalities to be unjust and
it leaves too little room for diﬀerences arising from legitimate forms of demo-
cratic decision-making.
5.1 Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the
Formal-Procedural Account
As mentioned in section three, proponents of the formal-procedural account are
chieﬂy worried about the protection of people's basic rights and their associated
liberties. Thus, the formal-procedural account only objects to inequalities, no
matter whether social or environmental, which directly undermine a person's
formal status and rights. In other words, our geographies of risk, which we
outlined in section two, are oftenfrom the viewpoint of a formal-procedural
understanding of justice and democratic citizenshipof very limited use unless
they directly undermine a citizen's basic formal rights and liberties.
That is to say, if some members of society suﬀer from higher exposure to
non-lethal toxins and bad air quality, a defender of the formal-procedural ac-
count would not call such a state of aﬀairs unjust, unless this exposure directly
undermined the people's ability to exercise their most basic formal rights and
liberties, for instance through causing premature death. Of course, existing the-
ories can be more or less strict with regard to upholding their formal-procedural
understanding of justice, meaning that some theories might object to all those
environmental inequalities which (in a meaningful manner) statistically correlate
with lower life expectancy. However, even if one were to include such cases (and
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they are extremely diﬃcult to prove, i.e. to show beyond the shadow of a doubt
that unjust exposure to a toxin on its own caused premature death), overall, on
a purely formal-procedural reading most environmental inequalities and their
associated geographies of risk would prove normatively unobjectionable.
The formal-procedural account does not see the correlation of geographies
of exposure and geographies of vulnerability as a worrisome indicator for the
existence of distinct geographies of risk, which unearth the cumulative eﬀects
of environmental and socio-economic disadvantage. This is especially true if
disadvantaged members of society had the possibility to vote, for example, on
where to place a waste-site, since if they had the formal possibility to take part in
such decision-making any decision being a result of majority voting would have
to be seen as legitimate. In other words, the formal-procedural account worries
about the (non)existence of people's formal rights to democratic citizenship but
not the substantial quality and value of these rights (Daniels 1975).
While a formal-procedural position is of course logically consistent and legit-
imate, we think that such an assessment of the deontic status of socio-environ-
mental inequalities would in many cases add insult to injury for those suﬀering
from multiple and cumulative forms of disadvantage, exposure and vulnerabil-
ity. To claim that everything is ﬁne unless people aredue to environmental
exposuretoo sick to vote or more generally speaking too sick to perform their
basic formal rights and liberties seems rather cynical. Moreover, there seems to
be something objectionable about vast environmental inequalities which nega-
tively impact people's lives and their well-being, even if these inequalities were
legitimised through a democratic vote. This is particularly true in cases in which
certain minority groups in society would suﬀer from political domination by a
majority.
5.2 Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the
Comprehensive-Substantive Account
Assessing environmental inequalities through the lens of the comprehensive-
substantive account leads to problems at the opposite end of the scale. The
preconditions for democratic citizenship which the comprehensive-substantive
account sets out are simply too demanding, since the idealistic conception of
justice it is based upon calls for a far-reaching re-invention of society. To ensure
free and equal citizenship it would not only be necessary to correct most social-
economic inequalities but from an environmental justice perspective to change
most past policy decisions on how to allocate the beneﬁts and burdens (including
risks) of diﬀerent environmental factors, such as exposure to toxins and the like.
This is especially problematic in the case of environmental decisions concern-
ing the distribution of waste-sites or exposure to toxins. Since it is due to tech-
nical or safety reasons nearly impossible to geographically distribute these sites
in a way not being in conﬂict with comprehensive egalitarian principles of dis-
tributive justice, any slightly unequal distribution across a society's geographies
of risk would have to be deemed initially objectionable, meaning that a society
which distributes some risks unequally would have to compensate its disadvan-
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taged citizens through other means.14 This is problematic for two reasons: First,
assessing environmental inequalities from the perspective of the comprehensive-
substantive account becomes almost impossible, since it calls for more or less
constant re-distributions within and beyond geographies of risk, which might
simply not be realizable in practice. Second, even if one were able to constantly
re-distribute, such a scheme seems to call for a huge state apparatus to adminis-
ter the measurement of seemingly small socio-environmental diﬀerences and the
ensuing re-distribution.
Therefore, while the comprehensive-substantive account might give us an
attractive account of what an ideal society of equals in socio-economic and envi-
ronmental terms could look like, its normative vision is too ideal and demanding
in order to provide a good basis for normative assessment of real world socio-
environmental inequalities. Since the aim of this paper was to bring together
empirical research with normative theory, in our view it would seem odd to
argue for a normative framework in which virtually all inequalities, no matter
whether social or environmental, would prove objectionable and unjust. What
seems to be more plausible in order to assess social and environmental inequali-
ties, therefore, is a less demanding account than the comprehensive-substantive
account, but an account which is substantive enough not to render all social and
environmental inequalities irrelevant.
5.3 Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the Moderately
Demanding Social-Egalitarian Account
The moderately demanding social egalitarian account oﬀers us a normative
framework which works well with our geographies of socio-environmental risk,
since it allows us to diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent forms of inequality and their
eﬀects. The reason why the social-egalitarian framework is most useful is that it
is, on the one hand, demanding enough, since it lays out quite strict conditions
for protecting people's equal social status and especially their right to free and
equal citizenship, while on the other hand, it is ﬂexible enough to allow for both
democratic self-determination and the existence of legitimate inequalities.
If, for instance, all members of society took a vote on where to build a new
waste treatment facility, and if the background conditions for this vote had
been just and all citizens had indeed been able to participate as free and equal
citizens, then social-egalitarians would have no issue with the facility being built
in location A rather than location B, even if the eventual building site was
located close to a socio-economically disadvantaged part of town. If however
the result of the vote on where to build the waste treatment facility had been
compromised by underlying socio-economic inequalities, such as strong lobbying
eﬀorts by the rich to build the facility on a site close to a disadvantaged part of
town, social egalitarians would argue that such a vote's result is illegitimate.
Since members of the disadvantaged part of town had neither the means to
14 In fact, defenders of the comprehensive-substantive account see already diﬀerential ge-
ographies of exposure as objectionable, independent of whether unequal exposure tracks socio-
economic inequalities and vice versa.
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campaign for their interests nor adequate information on the long-term eﬀects
of the facility on health, according to social egalitarians these equal democratic
citizenship undermining diﬀerences must be deemed unjust. Moreover, social
egalitarians would object to the fact that the disadvantaged are already amongst
the most vulnerable and susceptible members of society, a state of aﬀairs exac-
erbated by the result of the vote and thus heightening existing inequalities with
regard to the geography of risk, since exposure would now seem to track socio-
economic disadvantage. Therefore, on a social-egalitarian reading, in this second
case, the vote as well as the placement of the waste treatment facility would be
considered unjust.
As this example shows, in contrast to the formal-procedural account the
moderately demanding social-egalitarian conception of justice and democratic
citizenship allows to distinguish between diﬀerent grounds on the basis of which
we might deem certain inequalities objectionable, or not. At the same time, the
social-egalitarian framework is not as idealist and demanding as the comprehen-
sive-substantive account. Therefore, according to the moderately demanding
reading not all environmental inequalities undermine free and equal citizenship.
This is a crucial point which relates back to the discussion of the empirical
literature in part two and shows why we think it is important to identify dis-
tinct geographies of risk, rather than just isolated inequalities of exposure or
proximity.
Through combining the results of empirical studies on diﬀerential exposure
and on complex and multiple socio-economic vulnerability, geographies of risk
highlight the nexus between `purely' environmental aspects and social, political
and economic aspects, which in combination can very much undermine a person's
status as a free and equal citizen. The moderately demanding social-egalitarian
account is uniquely able to pick up on the existence of harmful geographies of
risk by problematizing instances of unequal political inﬂuence, socio-economic
domination and illegitimate diﬀerences in risk exposure. The social-egalitarian
account is interested in both the substantive conditions for free and equal citizen-
ship and the legitimate authority of democracy, that is, the justiﬁability of po-
litical decision-making to all relevant parties. It is because of this twofold scope
that the moderately demanding social-egalitarian account is not only best suited
to assessing the normative status of existing environmental inequalities, but also
to explaining whyif we take our bearing from existing empirical researchwe
should consider many environmental inequalities to be indeed unjust but others
to be legitimate
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to link empirical ﬁndings concerning environmen-
tal inequalities with diﬀerent possible normative yard-sticks for assessing these
inequalities and to judge whether certain environmental inequalities should be
deemed unjust, or not. As we pointed out in section 2 such an inquiry must
necessarily take into account some caveats regarding both empirical research
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and normative theory. We argued that contextualising the results found in the
empirical literature within the wider research on inequality and social disad-
vantage, and studying signiﬁcant overlaps between geographies of exposure and
geographies of vulnerability allows us to derive normatively relevant geographies
of risk, which track relevant inequalities across diﬀerent dimensions.
We then shifted our attention to the question of what kind of normative ac-
counts of justice and democratic citizenship might help us in evaluating which
environmental inequalities represent socio-environmental injustices. After re-
viewing three paradigmatic accounts, we argued for utilising a moderately de-
manding social-egalitarian account of justice and democratic citizenship for iden-
tifying unjust instances of socio-environmental inequality. As our analysis in sec-
tion four showed, a moderately demanding social-egalitarian framework enables
researchers to carefully disentangle the diﬀerent grounds on which geographies
of risk, respectively which socio-environmental inequalities, might be deemed
unjust and under what conditions they must be accepted as legitimate. More-
over, establishing distinct geographies of risk allows researchers to uncover the
often harmful nexus between multiple and partially cumulative forms of social,
economic and environmental disadvantage. It is only by combining results on
diﬀerences in exposure with results on varying vulnerability that we arrive at
a proper understanding of social and environmental risk, which in turn enables
us to make, based on a suitable normative framework, an informed and critical
assessment of an inequality's deontic status.
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